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Patrick Casey will graduate this May with highest distinction in the fields of History and 
German, having also taken—and having thoroughly enjoyed—a smattering of credits in half a 
dozen nominally unrelated fields. In the course of his studies, he has been named an IPFW 
Withers Scholar, has received an award for Excellence in Foreign Language for German, and 
joins Jessica Cortesi in being named one of the Outstanding History seniors. While studying, 
Patrick has also maintained full-time employ at JCPenney, which has not yet killed him. Plans 
for the future remain in flux, but one might reasonably assume there will be travel involved.  
 
Abstract 
Since the convening of the Austrian Historical Commission in 1998, the state of scholarly 
literature is all but unanimous: the classification of Austria as a victim collective was clearly at 
odds with historical reality. Where the preponderance of literature to this point has concentrated 
on deconstructing the Austrian victim myth, this paper analyzes its creation and the political 
exigencies which allowed it. It further characterizes the victim myth, not as the vindication, but 
rather as the creation of an Austrian Nation. This paper approached the question through two 
sets of sources; first, documents concerning Austria meant for the public; decrees, propaganda, 
and the like. Second, it examines the process through the classified orders and communique of 
political and intelligence officers, military personnel, and diplomatic officials. While this paper 
makes use of long public Western sources, it was not until somewhat recently that Soviet 
archives became available, so this is amongst the first works to have Soviet perspective on 
Austria’s role in the war and later political struggles.  
 
Austrian political identity in the wake of the Habsburg collapse was fluid; a popular referendum 
to unify with Germany passed overwhelmingly in 1919, but was blocked by the Allied Powers, 
who did not want to see a German resurgence. The Great Depression only deepened the crisis, 
so that “to all but a handful, the idea of an independent Austria was simply inconceivable.” 
Even after unification with Germany, American, British, Soviet, and Austrian elites all viewed 
Austria as a politically malleable state. In early 1943, the British Ministry of Information first 
proposed the Moscow Declaration, promising Austrians lenient treatment, should they aid in the 
Allied advance.  
 
After the collapse of the Nazi regime in 1945, Austria was split into American, British, and 
Soviet zones of control. To avoid exploitation and a more vigorous denazification—which was 
seen as a likely pretext for permanent Soviet or American involvement—the Austrians began 
producing documentary “proofs” of victimhood, the most famous of which is the Rot-Weiss-Rot 
Buch. As Cold War tensions began to heighten, the Austrian public and the Provisional 
Government, fighting to avoid reparations and a second humiliating guilt clause, consolidated 
themselves more firmly behind the Opferdoktrin—the victim doctrine. The Soviets and the 
Allies could not refute the Opferdoktrin. In the first place, it effectively nullified the threat of a 
future German reunification, which remained a concern in post-War politics. Additionally, 
while competing for influence in Austria, neither the Americans nor the Soviets wished to take a 
more aggressive stance and risk alienating the Austrian populace. As a result, the Opferdoktrin, 
while shielding Austrian Nazis and collaborators, opened a path to independence and neutrality 
for the Austrian people. Furthermore, in identifying with the myth of a resilient, but deeply 
wronged Austria, the previously apathetic Austrian populace was provided with a desirable 
corporate identity, which shielded them against repercussions and crowned them with the 
laurels of tragic heroism. 
 
Bibliographical Note 
 
In writing this paper, the author drew on a variety of sources. The topic of Austrian history being 
somewhat outside the mainstream in English speaking countries, the author did the 
preponderance of his research in the original German. The document sources used in this paper 
might be split into those intended for public consumption, and those which most certainly were 
not. In the first class was a series of documentary histories, compiled and published by the 
Austrian Provisional Government during the Allied occupation, which sought to prove Austrian 
innocence in World War II; the exemplar of this genre being the Rot-Weiss-Rot Buch, published 
by the state press in 1946. Other public sources included speeches drawn from prominent figures, 
various government declarations and accords, laws passed within the individual allied zones of 
control, and a series of public discourses between Austrian and Soviet officials on the fitness of 
Austria to govern itself. Among the sources not intended for public consumption were the 
personal papers of the chief American and British diplomats in Austria, American, British, and 
Soviet orders and reports dealing with denazification and the reapportionment of the German 
Eigentum, Soviet directives to the KPÖ (Communist Party of Austria), orders from Soviet 
military commanders, as well as the analyses and reports of Soviet political officers on the 
ground. In most cases, the author was able to find topic specific volumes of compiled documents 
related to his theme, which, with the addition of the online database and archives managed by the 
Univeristy of Innsbruck Institut für Zeitgeschichte, allowed him to perform a reasonably 
thorough investigation of his subject. Exciting though they are, the author could not have read 
the recently released Soviet documents in the original Russian, so a note of special thank goes 
out to Wolgang Müller et al for their compilation Sowjetische Politik in Oesterreich, 1945-55: 
Dokumente aus russiscchen Archiven, and to Stefan Karner and Barbara Stetzl-Marx for their 
Die Rote Armee in Österreich : sowjetische Besatzung, 1945-1955, without which this would 
have been a far less intriguing—and less satisfying—project. The secondary literature on this 
subject is remarkably rich, and had seen a strong ressurgence in the last twenty years. Of special 
note here are Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka, whose prolific—not to say voluminous—and 
thoughtful treament of Austrian historical identity and whose fearless challenges to the idols of 
popular memory proved essential to this paper. 
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Abstract 
  
Twenty two years after the collapse of the Somalian government, a functioning nation state has 
yet to appear in the east African country. Attempts were made early on by the United Nations to 
end suffering and restore order to the chaotic environment, but these attempts failed to produce 
lasting effects. This paper discusses the sociopolitical conditions within Somalia, the inability of 
outside actors to operate in the complex environment, and the lack of political will in the United 
States to continue the humanitarian mission after setbacks as well as the effect these conditions 
had on the overall failure that occurred. By compiling several articles that have attempted to 
explain the failure of the first post-Cold War intervention attempt, as well as survey statistics 
and news articles, this project synthesizes components of several arguments into three 
significant explanations. The first argument presented is that the family based social structure of 
Somalia was too complex an environment for the western powers to operate in, thus the 
attempts to enforce a western idea of order was failed from its onset. The second argument is 
that the military and humanitarian forces deployed into Somalia failed to cooperatively function 
in a way that would have led to a successful mission. The third and final argument this work 
postulates is the effect political opinion in the US had on the continuation of attempted aid 
operations as certain events, particularly the October 3, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, unfolded in 
Somalia. As current and future historians look back on the crisis state that is Somalia, the two 
decade period of statelessness will be its hallmark. Had the US led attempts by the United 
Nations proved successful, a vastly different history may have been written in Somalia as well 
as other African nations that experienced great periods of suffering in the last two decades. 
 
 
 
 
Bibliographical Note 
 
Academic journal articles were the majority of sources cited in this paper for a few reasons. The 
first reason is that there are not many books that attempt to shed light on the operations of the 
United Nations in Somalia over the entire course of the intervention attempt. Because most of the 
events in question occurred within a small time frame approximately twenty years ago and 
possibly because of the confusing nature of the situation, few over-arching and in-depth attempts 
have been made by scholars to discern what went wrong in Somalia. At first this seemed 
detrimental to my research. However, the plurality of viewpoints on the matter provided several 
possible answers to why intervention failed. Also, connecting the dots in the similarities between 
those viewpoints created a sense of understanding and provided me with helpful background 
knowledge as well as a well-supported thesis. 
 
 
